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Practitioners working in the criminal 
justice system pride themselves on their 
high standards of  ethical behaviour and 
are typically adamant that the assessment 
and rehabilitation of  offenders can proceed 
according to traditional, although possibly 
modified, professional codes of  practice 
(Bush, Connell and Denny, 2006; Haag, 
2006; Levenson and D’Amora, 2005).  
The claim made by such individuals is  
that offender rehabilitation meets the ethical 
standards of  mental health practice and does 
not involve coercion or punishment in any 
meaningful sense. However, some researchers 
have strongly contested this view and argue 
that the treatment of  offenders departs so 
radically from traditional rehabilitation 
practice that it is best conceptualised as 
a form of  punishment. According to this 
perspective, traditional professional codes are 
hopelessly inadequate to guide correctional 
and forensic interventions and ought to be 
replaced by legal frameworks (Glaser, 2003). 
Indeed, in a recent paper Bill Glaser argued 
that because of  their focus on community 
protection and the administration of  
mandated interventions, sex offender  
interventions ought to be viewed within a 
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therapeutic jurisprudence framework. Glaser asserted 
that approaching therapy with sex offenders through a 
legal lens is likely to result in greater ethical outcomes and 
avoid the inevitable conflicts and confusions that arise 
from transplanting mental health ethical codes to forensic 
settings. 
In my view, theories of  punishment and rehabilitation 
models are best construed as distinct but complementary 
normative frameworks that address quite different problems: 
censure of  a crime and the imposition of  a burden on 
the offender versus problem reduction and well-being 
enhancement (see Ward and Langlands, forthcoming). 
However, I agree that the two frameworks overlap to some 
degree and that aspects of  what have been regarded as 
rehabilitation are in fact punishment.
The primary focus of  this paper is on the relationship 
between correctional interventions and the concept of  
punishment. The literature on punishment and its justification 
is large and it would take a book-length treatment to fully 
explore the practice and ethical problems arising from 
punishment in correctional practice arenas (Bennett, 2008; 
Boonin, 2008; Glaser, 2003; Golash, 2005; Kleinig, 2008). 
My aims in this paper are much more modest and I provide a 
brief  outline of  three major punishment theories and discuss 
their implications for correctional practice. Finally I conclude 
with some suggestions for future research and practice. 
Punishment: definition and problems
State-inflicted punishment in the criminal justice system 
involves the intentional imposition of  a burden on an 
individual following his or her violation of  important social 
norms that are intended to protect the significant common 
interests of  members of  the political community (Bennett, 
2008; Duff, 2001). Specifically, punishment in the criminal 
justice system has five necessary elements (Boonin, 2008): 
it is authorised by the state, intentional, reprobative (expresses 
disapproval or censure), retributive (follows a wrongful act 
committed by the offender) and harmful (results in suffering, a 
burden or deprivation to the offender). 
The issue of  justifying punishment arises because the 
harms inflicted on offenders may cause them significant 
suffering, be contrary to their best interests and also result 
in marked hardships to family, friends and even the broader 
community. The deliberate infliction of  suffering is something 
that is ordinarily considered to be morally wrong and thus 
requires explicit ethical justification if  the various actors of  
the criminal justice system are not to be ethically culpable. 
There are at least three major reasons why practitioners 
cannot avoid confronting the ethical challenges created by the 
institution of  punishment. First, from an external perspective, 
the day-to-day professional actions of  psychologists, social 
workers, therapists and programme staff  are embedded 
within criminal justice contexts. If  they become aware of  the 
infliction of  unjustified harms on offenders then they have 
an ethical obligation seek to end such injustices. 
Failure to do so would arguably make them 
complicit in unacceptable practices. 
Second, the assumptions concerning 
punishment are likely to be reflected in the 
specific penal policies and practices embedded in 
the criminal justice system and constrain or even 
directly shape the professional tasks constituting 
the roles of  correctional practitioners. For 
example, consequentialist views of  punishment 
are usually linked to crime reduction by way of  an 
emphasis on deterrence, incapacitation or reform 
of  offenders. A primary goal therefore is to reduce 
crime and the risks posed by offenders. Within 
a risk reduction paradigm the professional roles 
of  psychologists will be centred on risk detection 
and there will be less time for other types of  
therapeutic interventions. In a real sense, what comprises 
good psychological practice is partly determined by policies 
underpinned by punishment assumptions (see below). 
Third, a more subtle point concerns the relationship 
between punishment practices and the assessment and 
rehabilitation tasks undertaken by practitioners. I have argued 
in a previous paper that punishment and rehabilitation 
involve two distinct frameworks, each centred on different 
types of  values (Ward and Langlands, in press). Punishment 
and related responses such as restorative justice are designed 
to respond to crime from an ethical viewpoint. Rehabilitation 
on the other hand revolves around prudential values: the 
object is to improve offenders’ social and psychological 
functioning by providing them with skills and resources 
to live better lives (Ward and Maruna, 2007). As both 
frameworks are relevant for programme staff, some aspects 
of  programmes may be better characterised as punishment 
than as treatment. For example, cognitive restructuring in 
sexual offending programmes usually involves confronting 
the offender (constructively) about the nature of  his offence 
and the degree to which he is responsible for the harm 
suffered by victims. 
These examples indicate that the justification of  
punishment is of  relevance and ethical concern for all 
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practitioners. It is not possible to insulate the role of  
programme deliverers or treatment providers from ethical 
issues associated with punishment. Therefore, practitioners 
need to have some general familiarity with different theories 
of  punishment and the clinical and ethical implications that 
follow from them. 
Punishment and practice: consequentialism
Theory
Consequentialist theories of  punishment locate their 
justification in the consequences of  the practice: they are 
forward-looking theories (Bennett, 2008). The claim is that 
punishment functions to deter, incapacitate or reform 
offenders and that these effects in turn reduce the overall 
crime rate, and that this is what justifies them. There is 
nothing particularly important about punishment as an 
institution from this standpoint; it is simply viewed as the 
most effective way of  cutting the crime rate. Thus it is argued 
that a threat of  punishment may deter individuals from 
committing crimes in the first place or stop 
offenders from committing further crimes 
because they want to avoid additional 
suffering. It is accepted that infliction of  
suffering is ordinarily a bad thing but that 
in the case of  state-inflicted punishment any 
harmful effects of  punishment on offenders 
and their families are outweighed by the 
greater reduction of  suffering to victims, 
potential victims and the wider community. 
The relationship is called a contingent one 
because its justification is based on the 
actual effects punishment has on crime rates. 
Thus, if  other ways of  reducing the crime 
rate, such as situational crime control, education, persuasion 
and so on, result in larger overall reductions in offending, 
then, according to consequentialist theorists, they should be 
implemented in its place. 
Practice implications
A first comment is that an emphasis on deterrence, prevention 
or incapacitation is liable to create a practice environment 
where there is significant pressure on staff  to detect and 
manage risk variables in individual offenders and within 
correctional contexts. The primary focus will be technical and 
revolve around the development of  procedures designed to 
reliably measure dynamic and static risk factors and then 
putting procedures in place to reduce or minimise these risk 
factors in the most cost efficient manner. 
Second, an exclusive focus on crime reduction by way 
of  deterrence, reform or incapacitation regards offenders 
as simply a means through which the community’s aims for 
safety are pursued, rather than as independent moral agents 
who ought to be reasoned with not coerced. The lack of  
recognition of  offenders as beings with inherent dignity and 
whose autonomy and equal standing should be acknowledged 
regards them as objects rather than fellow human beings 
(Bennett, 2008). 
Punishment and practice: retribution
Theory
Retributive theories are backward-looking and justify punishment 
in terms of  ‘its intrinsic justice as a response to crime’ (Duff, 
2001, p.19). Offenders are to be held accountable for their 
crimes by the inflicting of  burdens that are roughly equal in 
harm to those inflicted on their victims. It is also claimed that 
such punishment is justified by its beneficial consequences. 
However, the state is thought to be ethically obligated 
to punish offenders simply because of  the nature of  the 
wrongful act and not for any other reasons. Therefore, the 
fact that punishment does not reduce crime is not of  major 
concern to retributive theorists; it is fitting and just to punish 
in order to balance the moral ledger – offenders ‘deserve’ 
to suffer for the wrongful acts they have committed. The 
notion of  desert is vague and has been unpacked in terms 
of  distributive justice, vindication of  victims and expression 
of  anger (Boonin, 2008; Golash, 2005). The justice variant 
speaks to the supposed advantages that offenders accrue 
over law-abiding citizens and the need to annul any illegally 
gained benefits by imposing proportionate burdens on them: 
for example, fines or imprisonment for particularly serious 
offenses. The claim that victims are vindicated by punishments 
speaks to a need to respond to serious norm violations by 
signaling to offenders and community that what was done 
is unacceptable. Failure to impose punishment is thought to 
imply that the norms violated are not taken seriously and 
that the subsequent suffering of  victims is not important, 
an unacceptable ethical response. Finally, punishment can 
be viewed as a natural response to crime in that it is an 
institutionalised form of  expressing blame and resentment 
toward offenders, but in a way that is proportionate and 
modulated. Punishment acknowledges the autonomy and 
responsibility of  offenders and the significance of  the norms 
violated by holding offenders accountable. Failure to hold 
offenders accountable and to punish can be seen as an 
unacceptable form of  paternalism where individuals are 
viewed as morally deficient and lacking an understanding of  
what they did. 
Practice implications
A major implication is that less attention is given to the 
question of  how to intervene therapeutically in offenders’ 
The reason for the accent on responsibility 
rather than crime reduction and/or offender 
reintegration is that punishment is thought  
to be intrinsically related to the wrongful  
acts rather than to future beneficial 
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lives and more on holding them accountable. That is, overall, 
retributive theories are associated with correctional polices 
and practices that are responsibility-focused. The reason for the 
accent on responsibility rather than crime reduction and/
or offender reintegration is that punishment is thought to be 
intrinsically related to the wrongful acts rather than to future 
beneficial consequences. 
Relatedly, the emphasis on offender accountability means 
that victims’ rights and the community’s views will be given a 
priority in the sentencing process and subsequent correctional 
interventions. Because retributive reactions to crime are 
essentially backward-looking, punishment allows victims to 
express their anger and to have their experiences taken into 
account in the sentencing process. Accountability from a 
retributive perspective encourages offenders to face up to the 
nature of  the harm inflicted and to make amends through 
accepting the burdens associated with hard treatment (i.e., 
criminal sanctions such as imprisonment or probation). 
The reduced interest in treatment programmes and post-
release planning is to be expected because offenders are 
considered to be moral agents and therefore responsible for 
their crimes. The significant issues confronting correctional 
personnel are thought to be rooted in matters of  accountability 
and redress rather than therapy; in fact, rehabilitative 
interventions are looked at with suspicion because of  a fear 
that they imply a lack of  autonomy and responsibility in 
offenders. A danger of  highlighting moral accountability is 
that ethical considerations will be elevated over prudential or 
psychological ones and any areas of  psychological or social 
need overlooked. 
Punishment and practice: communication
Theory
Communicative justifications of  punishment have their 
basis in a liberal communitarian view of  political and moral 
public institutions (Duff, 2001). According to Duff  (2002), it 
is important to pay attention to the rights of  all stakeholders 
in the criminal justice system, including offenders, because 
of  their equal moral status; thus communicative theories of  
punishment have a relationship focus. From this perspective, 
offenders are viewed as members of  a normative community 
(i.e., ‘one of  us’) and therefore are bound and protected by 
the community’s public values: autonomy, freedom, privacy 
and pluralism. In essence, these values are those of  a liberal 
democracy where all human beings are deemed to have 
inherent dignity and have equal moral standing. A major 
assumption of  such a viewpoint is that any punishment 
should be inclusive of  offenders rather than exclusive. That 
is, while individuals who have committed public wrongs 
ought to be held to account because they have committed 
harmful actions against others, they ought be approached as 
beings of  value and dignity and treated with respect in the 
process of  administering punishment. The notion of  equal 
moral status means that punishment should seek to persuade 
rather than force offenders to take responsibility for their 
crimes. Furthermore, because offenders are viewed as fellow 
members of  the moral community it is taken for granted that 
the aim of  punishment is to communicate the wrongness 
of  their actions in order to give them an opportunity to 
redeem themselves and ultimately be reconciled to the 
community. Duff  argues that hard treatment 
such as imprisonment is obligatory because it 
draws offenders’ attention to the seriousness of  
the wrongs they committed and appropriately 
expresses social disapproval. Crimes are viewed 
as violations of  important community norms 
that the offender is assumed to endorse as well. 
Duff  argues that there are three aims integral 
to the institution of  punishment: secular 
repentance, reform, and reconciliation through 
the imposition of  sanctions. More specifically, 
he argues that punishment is ‘a burden imposed 
on an offender for his crime, through which, it is 
hoped, he will come to repent his crime, to begin 
to reform himself, and thus reconcile himself  with those he 
has wronged’ (Duff, 2001, p.106). 
Practice implications
As a theory of  punishment Duff ’s communicative theory has 
the virtue of  being inclusive rather than exclusive. All the 
stakeholders affected by crime are taken into account in the 
implementation of  punishment. The offender is regarded as 
an equal moral agent and treated with the respect and dignity 
this status entails. A notable feature of  inclusive theories is 
that they conceptualise crime as a community responsibility 
rather than simply as an individual one. Thus offenders are 
held accountable to the community. Victims do not have to 
forgive but owe offenders the chance to reintegrate into the 
community once they have served their sentence; and the 
community is obligated to facilitate the process of  integration 
by providing necessary resources such as education, training, 
accommodation, access to social networks and so on. 
The inclusiveness of  the response to crime and its 
aftermath that is characteristic of  communicative theories 
of  punishment such as Duff ’s bears a striking relationship 
to restorative justice practices (Johnstone, 2002; Walgrave, 
2008; Ward and Langlands, 2008). According to Walgrave, 
restorative justice is ‘an option for doing justice after the 
occurrence of  an offence that is primarily oriented towards 
Punishment and Correctional Practice: Ethical and Rehabilitation Implications 
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repairing the individual, relational and social harm caused 
by that offence’ (Walgrave, 2008, p.21). For our purposes, 
this means that some of  the restorative justice initiatives, 
such as family conferences, sentencing circles and victim–
offender conferences, may be accurately viewed as aspects of  
punishment as conceived within the communicative theory. 
From a practice viewpoint, secular repentance takes seriously 
the moral agency of  offenders and the importance of  their 
appreciating the harm they have inflicted on victims and 
community. The reform element of  the 
communicative theory refers to the offender 
becoming motivated to change his or her 
self  and behaviour for ethical as well as 
prudential reasons. The realisation that they 
have unjustifiably caused other people to 
suffer will hopefully lead to a firm resolution 
to do what is necessary to make sure they 
do not do this again. Finally, the reconciliation 
element of  the communicative theory of  
punishment expresses both offenders’ and 
the community’s desire for reconciliation. 
There are two facets to reconciliation that 
are clinically relevant: offenders’ obligation 
to apologise and make reparations, and the 
community’s obligation to help the offender reintegrate back 
into the community once hard treatment is served. 
Punishment and professional codes of ethics
I would like to briefly discuss the implications of  our analysis 
of  punishment for the normative status of  practitioners’ 
codes of  ethics. As stated in the introduction, some theorists 
have argued that because professional codes of  mental health 
ethics are not easily transferred to forensic treatment contexts, 
practitioners ought to look elsewhere for ethical guidance, 
possibly to legal paradigms such as therapeutic jurisprudence 
(Glaser, 2003). A notable feature of  this argument is its 
claim that correctional treatment amounts to punishment 
because of  its coercive (implicitly or explicitly) nature and 
close association with criminal sanctions. The assertion 
that an overlap between punishment and treatment exists 
is in my view correct, as is the contention that traditional 
ethical mental health codes are insufficient on their own to 
provide comprehensive guidance to therapists working with 
offenders. However, the existence of  an overlap between the 
normative frameworks of  punishment and rehabilitation 
does not necessarily mean they do not also have unique 
domains of  application. Punishment is an ethical response 
to public wrongs, while rehabilitation deals with prudential 
concerns of  offenders. A unique feature of  work with 
offenders is that practice is concerned sometimes with the 
implementation of  punishment (e.g., aspects of  cognitive 
restructuring) and on other occasions with helping offenders 
to enhance their functional competency (e.g., communication 
skills). The dual nature of  practice roles suggests that neither 
traditional mental health ethical codes nor norms regulating 
punishment are able to satisfactorily cover the range of  tasks 
confronting programme providers and practitioners working 
within the criminal justice system. Rather, I propose that a 
mixed or hybrid ethical code is required, containing a set of: (a) 
principles and standards derived from mental health codes, 
and (b) principles and standards adequate to guide the action 
of  criminal justice personnel involved with the delivery 
of  state-sanctioned punishment. That is, I argue that a 
correctional practice code of  ethics that explicitly addresses 
both the punishment and rehabilitation tasks constituting 
the professional roles of  psychologists, social workers and 
programme deliverers employed within correctional services 
is necessary. Human rights values and the concept of  human 
dignity that these values protect can be consulted when there 
are conflicts between the rehabilitation and punishment 
strands comprising a hybrid correctional code (Shultziner, 
2007; Ward and Birgden, 2007; Ward and Syversen, 2009). 
The notion of  human dignity is a seminal moral concept 
that signifies the intrinsic value and universal moral equality 
of  human beings. Due to their inherent dignity, all human 
beings are presumed to have the same degree of  moral 
standing when it comes to considering the social and 
political arrangements that directly affect their core interests 
and subsequent well-being. The concept of  dignity and its 
elaboration into human rights values is especially useful in 
the resolution of  conflicts between lower-level systems of  
norms because it is a foundational moral concept accepted 
across different cultures and states (for an analysis of  dignity 
and its role in correctional ethical decision making see Ward 
and Syversen, 2009). 
Arguably, a rich theory of  punishment such as Duff ’s 
(2002) communicative theory has the conceptual resources 
to survive inevitable tensions arising from a mixed ethical 
code, but I have reservations that pure consequentialist or 
retributive justifications of  punishment will be able to face any 
subsequent conflicts as well. The reason why consequentialist 
theories are likely to struggle to effectively deal with the dual 
role of  correctional practitioners is due to their subversion of  
offender agency and dignity in the pursuit of  crime reduction. 
From a consequentialist viewpoint, there is no intrinsic 
value or point to considering offenders’ human dignity or 
agency. Meanwhile, a major problem for retributive theories 
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occurs due to an emphasis on individual responsibility and 
a tendency for practices based on retributive assumptions to 
be implemented in vindictive and offender-exclusive ways 
(Golash, 2005). A worry here is that individual responsibility 
issues may drown out calls to acknowledge offenders’ 
standing as fellow citizens and thus deserving of  meaningful 
opportunities to be successfully reintegrated. By way of  
contrast, the inclusive nature of  communicative theories of  
punishment, with their valuing of  reconciliation and reform, 
means they are more welcoming of  reintegration initiatives 
and accept the right of  offenders to be treated with respect 
due to all members of  the normative community. 
Conclusions
It is evident from my analysis above that there are different 
justifications for punishment, each with unique varying 
implications for practice. However, it could be argued that 
while punishment may be ethically justified in a world 
characterised by equality and justice, it cannot be justified 
in the world as it currently exists. That is, offenders are often 
victims of  such severe social and psychological disadvantages 
that their capacity for moral agency is considerably eroded 
(Gatti, Tremblay and Vitaro, forthcoming). Aside from 
the existence of  factors having an impact on offenders’ 
moral competency, it could also be asserted that the power 
differentials currently evident within the criminal justice 
system make it practically impossible to engage in any 
system of  punishment that is fair and respectful of  offenders’ 
inherent dignity (Duff, 2001). While I acknowledge these 
criticisms, it is still the case that punishment practices evident 
in the criminal justice system rest on ethical assumptions and 
it therefore makes sense to critically evaluate the cogency of  
these assumptions and their supporting theories. Normative 
analysis can help policy makers and practitioners become 
aware of  the ethical legitimacy of  current punishment 
practices and of  their subsequent responsibilities to press for 
any changes needed in the light of  such investigations. 
Irrespective of  the above questions, a clear message 
emerges from my analysis of  punishment theories: 
correctional practitioners ought to be aware of  the tasks they 
are involved in and to what degree such tasks are ethical, 
prudential or a combination of  both in nature. Importantly, 
correctional practitioners need to critically reflect on the 
theory of  punishment (or indeed, theories) that underpins 
their work in correctional contexts and ensure that the 
practice components following or associated with these 
assumptions are ethically warranted. Offenders are subject to 
state-sanctioned intended harms and have severe restrictions 
placed on their lives. In my view, practitioners do offenders a 
grave injustice if  justifications for these imposed burdens are 
carelessly arrived at and thoughtlessly delivered.
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